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(Crim. No. 12308. In Bank. Oct. 30, 1968.] 
In rc HENDERSON HARRIS on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Habeas Corpus-Grounds-Unconstitutional Statute.-Habeas 
corpus lies to test the constitutionality of statutes providing 
for the mesne process of civil arrest (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 478-
504) under which the petitioner has been imprisoned and is 
now constructively restrained on bail. 
[2] Bail .-. In Civil Cases - Penalty Assessment. - Pen. Code, 
§ 13521; providing for the levy of a penalty assessment on bail 
deposits for certain offenses, does not apply to the '!Jail fur-
nished by a civil defendant, and thus a court's requirement of 
a penalty assessment on one subjected to the mesne process of 
civil arrest (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 478-504) was unauthorized. 
[3a,3b] Constitutional Law-Due Process-Notice and Hearing.-
A state cannot deprive a person of his life, liberty or property 
without affording him an opportunity to be heard by a tribu-
nal empowered to decide the lawfulness of the deprivation, 
and a defendant who is deprived of his liberty by civil process 
is as much entitled to due process of law as a criminal defend-
ant deprived of his liberty. 
[4a, 4b] Arrest-Civil Cases-Arrest On Mesne Process-Uncon-' 
stitutionality of Statutes.-The statutory mesne process of 
civil arrest, as provided in Code Civ. Proc., §§ 478-504, falls 
(3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 315, 325; Am.Jur.2d, 
Constitutional Law, §§ 560, 569. 
[4] See Cal.Jur .2d, Rev., Arrest, § 5 et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, 
§ 52 et seq. . 
McX. Dig. References: (1] Habeas Corpus, § 15(2); (2] Bail 
Illld Recognizance, § 38; [3] Constitutional Law, § 177(3); (4] 
Arres,~ § 20. 
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short of the standards of due process of law by failing to 
make specific provision for a fair opportunity for defendant to 
be heard on the issue of the lawfulness of his incarceration, 
for which purpose Code Civ. Proc., § 503, is inadequate, in 
that, although it provides for the right of a defendant to 
apply to the court at any time before trial or judgment to 
vacate the arrest or reduce bail, it omits the necessary 
requirement that defendant should be given notice of such 
right. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
constructive custody of bail under civil arrest. Writ granted. 
Jane R. Brady for Petitioner. 
John D. Maharg, County Counsel, and Jean Louise Web-
ster, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent. 
Agnew, Miller, Carlson & Powers and Maynard J. Klein for 
Real Party in Interest. 
,TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner is in the constructive custody 
of bail under a civil arrest order of the Los Angeles County 
Superior Court. He questions the constitutionality of the stat-
utes that authorize arrest and imprisonment on an ex parte 
application of the plaintiff in a civil action. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§§ 478-504.) The statutes do not require that the defendant be 
brought into court after his arrest or that he be notified that 
he has the right to release on bail (Code Civ. Proc., § 486), 
the right to apply for reduction of bail (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 503), the right to appear in court to challenge the legality 
of the arrest (Code Civ. Proc., § 503), and the right to appear 
by counsel (Cooke v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 517, 537 
[69 L.Ed. 767, 774, 45 8.Ct. 390] ; Steen v. Board of Civil 
Service Comrs. (1945) 26 Ca1.2d 716,727 [160 P.2d 816]) and 
to seek appointment of counsel if he is indigent. l 
Petitioner contends that this statutory procedure does not 
meet the standards of due process of law. [1] Habeas cor-
lGovernment Code section 27706, subdivision (c), provides that upon 
request the publie defender "shall defend any person who is not finan-
cially able to employ eounsel in any civil litigation in whieh, in the judg-
ment of the public defender, the person is being perseeuted or unjustly 
harassed. ' , 
By chanee the facts as to petitioner's imprisonment came to the atten-
tion of the public defender, who obtained a hearing on a motion to reduce 
bail and petitioner's release on reduced bail. 
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II 
II II ) 
488 IN BE HARRIS [69 C.2d 
pus lies to test the constitutionality of the legislation under 
which the petitioner was imprisoned and is now constructively 
restrained on bail. (In re Petersen (1958) 51 Cal.2d 177, 181 
[331 P.2d 24, 77 A.L.R.2d 1291].) 
Petitioner agreed to buy a truck tractor from Motor Truck 
Distributors Co. for $16,591.30, payable in monthly install-
ments. He defaulted in his payments. Motor Truck Distribu-
tors Co. brought all action against him for recovery of the 
truck or $16,000 damages and invoked the remedy of claim 
and delivery. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 509-521.) The sheriff could 
not find petitioner or the truck and returned the complaint 
and claim and delivery process unserved. 
The company then invoked the remedy of mesne civil arrest 
and bail under the statutes here attacked. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§§ 478-504.) The procedures followed by the company, the 
court, and the sheriff complied with those statutes. The com-
pany presented declarations to the superior court under pen-
alty of perjury showing "that a sufficient cause of action 
exists, and that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 
479."2 (Code Civ. Proc., § 481.) The company filed an 
undertaking, as required by section 482, to "pay all costs 
which may. be adjudged to the defendant, and all damages 
which he may sustain by reason of the arrest, if the same be 
wrongful, or without sufficient cause." .[2] The court 
ordered the sheriff to arrest petitioner and fixed bail at 
$16,000 plus a $4,000 penalty assessment. a 
2Code of Civil Procedurc section 479 sets forth five" cases," defined 
in part by the nature of the action and in part by the conduct of the 
defendant, when the remedy of civil arrest is available. Among these cases 
is •• an action to recover the possession of personal property unjustly 
detained, when the property or any part thereof, has been concealed, 
removed, or disposed of, t.o prevent its being found or taken by the 
Sheriff.' , 
The declarations submitted by the company include an averment by a 
repossession agent that in October 1967 petitioner ., advised me that he 
could 1I0t and would not make any further payments on the truck. He 
further stated that he had no intention of giving up the truck, but rather 
that he would keep it out of my reach and the reach of plaintiff Motor 
'fruck Dish'ibutors Co." The agent set forth his many unsuccessful 
nttempts to find the truck. 
:IPenal Code section 13521 provides for the levy of a penalty assess-
ment of $5 for each $20 of •• every fine, penalty, and forfeiture imposed 
and collected by the courts for criminal offenses" other than violations 
of the Vehicle Code, traffic ordinances, and the Fish and Game Code . 
• , When any deposit of bail is made for an offense to which this action 
applies, the person making such deposit shall also deposit a sufficient 
nDlount to include the assessment ... _" If the bail is forfeited the 
:lsscssmcnt goes to tlte state Peace Officers' Training Fund. Section 
) 
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The sheriff arrested petitioner on March 5, 1968, when lle 
appeared at a sheriff's substation to report that the truck had 
been stolen from him. lie was allowed to telephone his em-
ployer and an attorney. (Pen. Code, § 815.5.) A sheriff's officer 
complied with the provision in Code of Civil Procedure section 
484 that the officer who arrests the defendant "must deliver to 
him a copy of the affidavit [that resulted in issuance of the 
,arrest order], and also, if desired, a copy of the order of 
'arrest. '" About March 6, 1968, a sheriff's officer served peti-
tioner with a summons and a complaint in the company's ac-
tion. About March 8 an attorney referred by petitioner's 
employer visited him in jail. This attorney filed an answer to 
the complaint but refused to take any action to obtain peti-
tioner's release from jail unless petitioner paid him $500. 
Petitioner was unable to pay this fee. 
Petitioner spent five weeks in jail with no opportunity to 
appear in the superior court to seek release from his deten-
tion. He wrote to the-Better Business Bureau stating that his-
custodians had told him he would be held until the company 
obtained a date for his court appearance or arranged for his 
release, "which could be forever." The bureau forwarded his 
letter to the Los Angeles County Public Defender. A deputy 
public defender interviewed petitioner, determined that he 
was indigent, and moved in the civil action for reduction of 
bail. On April 11, 1968, the sliperior court reduced bail to 
$1,000 plus a $250 penalty assessment. Ii Petitioner obtained a 
surety bond in this amount and has since been in the con-
structive custody of bail. 
[3a] A state cannot deprive a person of his life, liberty, or 
13521 is constitutional as applied to bail in a criminal ease. (People v. 
Norman (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 381, 398-399 [60 Cal.Rptr. 609].) 
The bail furnished by a civil defendant, however, is not •• for an offense 
to which this section [Penal Code section 13521] applies." The sureties 
who furnish bail for the civil defendant bind themselves that he will be 
amenable to the civil court's process" during the pendency of the action, 
and to such as may be issued to enforce the judgment therein, or that 
they will pay to the plaintiff the amount of any judgment which may 
be recovered in the action." (Code Civ. Proc., § 487.) Thus the bail is 
designed to assure the civil defendant's appearance and the satisfaction 
of any judgment for the plaintiff, not to fine or penalize the defendant. 
The court's requirement of a penalty assessment was therefore unauthor-
ized. {See 35 Ops. Cnl.Atty.Gcn. 77, 81·82 (1960).) 
'Section 484 is the only provision in the statutory civil arrest scheme 
(Code Civ. Proc., U 478·504) requiring the furnishing of any information 
to the defendant concerning his arrest. 
liAs to the impropriety of the penalty assessment in this civil action 
see fn. 3, svpra. 
, 
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property without affording him an opportunity to be heard by 
a tribunal empowered to decide the lawfulness of the depriva-
tion. (Armstrong v. Manzo (1965) 380 U.S. 545,550,552 [14 
L.Ed.2d 62, 65, 66-67, 85 S.Ct. 1187] ; Endler v. Schutzbank 
(1968) 68 Ca1.2d 162, 168, 180 [65 Cal.Rptr. 297, 436 
P.2d 297].) Under the statutory scheme for mesne civil arrest 
the state deprives the defendant of his liberty through the 
process of its trial courts executed by its law enforcement offi-
cers. Although the statutory macllinery is set in motion by a 
privat.e plaintiff to satisfy a civil claim, the deprivation of lib-
erty is effected by the state. (See Peterson v. Greenville 
(196:3) 373 U.S. 244, 247-248 [10 L.Ed.2d 323, 325-326, 83 
S.Ct. 1119]; Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) 334 U.S. 1, 13-14 [92 
L.Ed. 1161, 1180-1181, 68 S.Ct. 836, 3 A.L.R-.2d 441].) The 
due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United . States Constitution and article I, section 13, of 
the California Constitution is not afforded merely because the 
civil defendant may be able to get a hearing as to the lawful-
ness ,of his imprisonment by chance or by grace. [4a] The 
statute authorizing the deprivation must explicitly provide a 
fair opportunity for the defendant to be heard on that issue. 
(Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works (1915) 237 U.S. 413, 
424-425 [59 L.Ed. 1027, 1031-1032, 35 S.Ct. 625]; People v. 
Broad (1932) 216 Cal. 1, 7 [12 P.2d 941].) The provision that 
the arrested defendant may apply to the court at any time 
before trial or judgment to vacate the arrest order or to 
reduce bail (Code Civ. Proc., § 503) does not afford him a fair 
opportunity to challenge his imprisonment, for the Legisla-
ture has not required that he be given notice of his right to 
make the application. (See In re Lambert (1901) 134 Cal. 626, 
629 [66 P. 851, 86 Am.St.Rep. 296, 55 L.R-.A. 856].) 
Moreover, "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, 
of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by 
counsel." (Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 68 [77 
I.J.Ed. 158, 170,53 S.Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R-. 527] ; Gideon v. Wain-
wright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 344 [9 hEd.2d 799, 805, 83 8.Ct. 
792, 93 A.L.R-.2d 733] ; Specht v. Patterson (1967) 386 U.S. 
605, 608-609 [18 hEd.2d 326, 329-330, 87 S.Ct. 1209] ; In re 
(JUlIlt (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 36 [18 hEd.2d 527, 551, 87 S.Ct. 
1428].) The civil defendant cannot be expected to understand 
and to present the legal objections that may be raised in test-
ing the validity of the arrest order. (See Murray v. Superior 
Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 611, 618-619 [284 P.2d 1]; Ex parte 
Fukumoto (1898) 120 Cal. 316, 319-320 [52 P. 726] ; Pousson 
v. Superior Oourt (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 750, 753-754 [332 
P.2d 766].) An indigent defendant imprisoned under the proc-
ess of mesne civil arrest is confined in the same jail as the indi-
gent felon undergoing trial who is entitled to appointed coun-
sel under Gideon and the indigent misdemeanant who is 
serving a sentence imposed only after a trial at which he was 
entitled to appointed counsel under California's constitu-
tional standards. (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 614-615 
[58 Cal.Rptr. 579, 427 P.2d 179]; In re Johnson (1965) 62 
Ca1.2d 325, 329 [42 Cal.Rptr. 228, 398 P.2d 420.) [3b] A 
defendant who is deprived of his liberty by civil process is as 
much entitled to due process of law as a defendant w110 is 
deprived of his liberty because be is charged with crime. 
[4b] The mesne process of civil arrest without opportunity 
to be heard with the assistance of counsel is not due process. 
The writ is granted and petitioner is discharged from the 
constructive custody of bail. His surety will stand exonerated 
when this decision becomes final. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
